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The level of subjective visibility at different stages of memory processing
Zuzanna Skóra and Michał Wierzchoń
Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
ABSTRACT
Recent research suggests that the content of iconic memory (IM) and fragile visual short-
termmemory could be associated with a similar level of conscious accessibility as working
memory (WM). The results of our studies, in which we used a subjective visibility scale in a
partial-report change detection paradigm, indicate that it is possible to distinguish
separate stages of memory based on both discriminative accuracy and conscious
accessibility. The highest scores were associated with IM and the lowest with WM,
while somewhere in the middle there was fragile memory. Based on classical
assumptions, WM accessibility should be greater than the other two types of memory;
however, our study showed that this might not always be the case. We discuss the
potential sources of this outcome, of which one may be the task construction, as we
only tested items that were directly in the focus of attention.
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As described by the classical models, memory is not
a unified system (see e.g. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971;
Baddeley, 2012). It can be divided into the sensory
register (e.g. iconic memory – IM), working
memory (WM), and long-term memory (LTM). IM,
which is the first stage of visual information proces-
sing, is probed best through Sperling’s partial-report
paradigm (1960). He presented, for a very short time,
an array of letters arranged in rows. Through cuing
one of the rows with an audio cue after the pre-
sented stimuli disappeared, Sperling discovered
that more letters were recalled with this partial cue
than without. Therefore, he demonstrated that
there is probably more information held in IM than
could be reported in a whole report paradigm in
which no cue is utilised (Sperling, 1960).
Even though participants could recall only a
portion of information stored in IM, they claimed
that they “saw” the whole array of letters during
the partial-report paradigm. Based on the presented
data and on subjective reports of participants, there
is currently a debate regarding the subjective acces-
sibility of the content of different types of visual
memory. Researchers agree that IM and visual WM
(vWM) differ in terms of the subjective accessibility
of their content, although they do not agree on
how they differ (Block, 2011; Cohen & Dennett,
2011; Lamme, 2006). It is possible that the classical
partial-report paradigm is not suitable for investi-
gating the claimed differences. For example, the
paradigm has classically been based on verbal
material (letters) which could confound our investi-
gations focused only on visual memory. With this
in mind, we have used a modified version of this
paradigm, namely, the partial-report change detec-
tion paradigm described below.
The empirical questionof IMaccessibility is strongly
related toamuchmore important theoreticalquestion
onwhere consciousness arises in thememory system.
Could it be at the early stage of information proces-
sing, or maybe at later stages? Classically, only WM
(as opposed to IM and LTM) is viewed as a conscious
stage of memory processing. Atkinson and Shiffrin
(1971) assumed that the content of WM represented
conscious thought, although they have also claimed,
that “(… ) Such a statement lies in the realm of phe-
nomenology and, as stated, cannot be scientifically
verified” (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971, p. 5). On the
other hand, recent models associate awareness with
earlier stages of information processing (see e.g.
Lamme, 2006; Sandberg et al., 2013).
Here we propose coming back to this question
and, through utilising subjective awareness
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measures, explore when and to what extent the
information processed during the different stages
of memory becomes accessible to consciousness.
Is WM content indeed accessible to
consciousness?
Contrary to the classical approaches described
above, recent studies question the direct link
between WM and consciousness (Soto, Mäntylä, &
Silvanto, 2011; Soto & Silvanto, 2014). In one of
these studies, regarding vWM, Soto and colleagues
presented an example of vWM operating on uncon-
scious content. They compared accuracy in a dis-
crimination task with subjective assessment of
visibility, using the Perceptual Awareness Scale
(PAS – Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). Even on trials
where participants claimed no visibility (1 – “no
experience”), vWM performance was above the
chance discrimination accuracy. This was true over
a 5-second delay period. The conclusion was that
vWM and consciousness might be independent
after all (Soto & Silvanto, 2014).
A considerable number of studies investigating
the relation between WM and consciousness utilised
a modified change detection paradigm to explore
different stages of memory, specifically to assess
the capacity and subjective accessibility of infor-
mation (Lamme, 2006; Vandenbroucke et al., 2014).
During the classical change detection task
(Rensink, 2002), participants are presented with an
array of objects or a visual scene (memory display)
and, after a short interval with some kind of a disrup-
tion, a second display (test display) is presented in
which a small change might have occurred. Partici-
pants have to detect whether a change occurred.
The capacity denotes the number of items possibly
held in memory. In order to control the focus of
attention, Vandenbroucke, Sligte, and Lamme
(2011) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2014) combined
this task with Sperling’s partial-report paradigm
and called it a partial-report change detection para-
digm. During their research, they proposed extract-
ing a new stage in visual memory processing,
called fragile visual short-term memory (FM). FM is
claimed to be independent of attention and there-
fore qualitatively different from WM (Vanden-
broucke et al., 2011). In a study by Sligte, Scholte,
and Lamme (2008), FM was dissociated from IM
because FM, in contrast to IM, did not appear to
be erased by a light mask. The conclusion was that
unlike like IM, FM was not based on the after-
image and could only be erased by the appearance
of new items on the display (Sligte et al., 2008). Sligte
and colleagues also claim that FM may represent
“perception without immediate cognitive access”,
also referred to as “perceptual consciousness” by
some (Block, 2011).
Memory capacity measured using a
change detection task
Faced with the data presented above regarding the
separation between WM and consciousness and the
theoretical assumptions about consciousness associ-
ated with IM or FM, one would need to first separate
these stages of memory based on objective proces-
sing limits (i.e. capacity).
With use of the change detection task, research-
ers were able to assess the number of items possibly
held in vWM, which fluctuates between 2 and 7
items, depending on the complexity and type of
the object. Combining a change detection task
with a partial-report paradigm helped to assess the
capacity of IM (e.g. Sligte et al., 2008). Through intro-
ducing a spatial cue during the interval in a change
detection task, researchers assessed the capacity of
IM for around 30 items (which were usually white
rectangles on a black background – Sligte et al.,
2008). By introducing the cue later than 300–
500 ms, but earlier than 4 s after the offset of the
memory display, the capacity still remained around
twice the capacity of the vWM condition (i.e. with
offset >4 s – see Sligte et al., 2008). Some researchers
interpret this effect such that cuing may protect the
items held in memory from interference from the
test display (Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008), or
that cuing leads to removing the uncued items
and therefore freeing capacity (Souza, Rerko, &
Oberauer, 2014). Other researchers suggest that
there is an additional storage between IM and WM
with a set of qualitatively different characteristics,
namely, FM (Vandenbroucke et al., 2011) with a
capacity of up to 15 elements.
We attempt to test whether these three memory
stages could indeed be separated based not only on
the capacity limits, but also on the accessibility of
their content to conscious processing.
Conscious accessibility measured using a
change detection task
To assess conscious processing in memory, Vanden-
broucke et al. (2014) compared objective and
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subjective measures in a partial-report change
detection paradigm for the three memory stages:
IM, FM, and WM. The measure obtained through
comparing task accuracy with subjective ratings is
often called metacognitive sensitivity (the ability to
discriminate correct judgments from incorrect –
Fleming & Lau, 2014).1
What Vandenbroucke and colleagues found was
that the IM and WM are associated with a similar
level of metacognitive sensitivity, which is less pro-
nounced than the metacognitive sensitivity for FM.
In their second study, in which participants per-
formed a discrimination task instead of change
detection, the three memory types were associated
with the same level of metacognitive sensitivity.
How Vandenbroucke and colleagues explain this
effect is that the FM’s high capacity is based on con-
scious information processing (2014). The results of
this study contradict the classical view on memory,
which states that only WM is accessible to
consciousness.
Here, we propose that this surprising result might
have its origin in the inappropriate subjective scale
usage. This is because Vandenbroucke and col-
leagues used Confidence Rating (CR), which is a
measure of metacognitive judgment of knowledge
(i.e. judgment of the quality of the classification
process but not the subjective visibility, see Over-
gaard & Sandberg, 2012).
Our study
The differences in capacity between the three afore-
mentioned memory stages seem to be well
described. What remains unresolved is the question
of the differences between the memory stages
regarding the conscious accessibility of processed
information. So far, there is a discrepancy between
classical theories which postulate a difference
between WM and IM, and recent experiments
which suggest that there is either an opposite differ-
ence (e.g. unconscious WM – Soto et al., 2011), or no
difference at all (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014).
Our aim is to replicate the effect found in the
paper by Vandenbroucke et al. (2014) which
suggests that the three memory types do not
differ in terms of conscious accessibility of their
content. One of the major changes we made was
administering a more appropriate subjective scale
of awareness; namely PAS, which is a measure of
subjective visibility, not a judgment of knowledge
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). The experiments pre-
sented in this paper combine the partial-report
change detection paradigm with the subjective visi-
bility measure for the three types of memory: IM, FM,
and WM
Experiment 1
The first experiment aims to investigate the accessi-
bility of information under FM and WM conditions.
We used the partial-report change detection para-
digm, during which participants were required to
first memorise the displayed items (memory
display) and then perform a change detection task
(test display). We employed two conditions: either
the cue appeared before the test display (FM), or
after a short presentation of the test display (WM).
We further applied the PAS to evaluate conscious
access to the content of memory.
Method
Participants
Twenty students from Jagiellonian University (7
males and 13 females with the mean age of 24.3,
SD = 2.39) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision took part in the first experiment. Two partici-
pants were excluded from further analysis due to
their apparently random performance in the WM
condition (accuracy around 50%). Participants read
and signed an informed consent form prior to the
study and were debriefed regarding the purpose
of the experiment at the end. There was no financial
compensation.
Equipment and stimuli
The experiment was created and run on PsychoPy
v.1.79.01 Software®. The stimuli were displayed on
a 16.4 in, generic PnP monitor with a refresh rate
of 60 Hz. Participants were tested individually
while seated about 50 cm from the monitor (the
viewing distance was unconstrained). The total
viewing angle of the display was approximately
40.1° × 23.2°.
The stimulus was placed on a black background
and consisted of eight white rectangles (each
3.12° × 0.78° in size) in horizontal, vertical or
oblique (45° or 135°) orientations. The fixation
point was a red cross (height of 0.1°, Arial font)
1Usually this is associated with confidence ratings; in our study, we obtain this measure by comparing task accuracy with PAS ratings.
JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 3
placed at the centre of the display. All the rectangles
were arranged in an imaginary circle around the fix-
ation point. The cue was a white six-pixel-thick line
with one end pointed at the fixation point and the
other at one of the rectangles.
Trial design
The experiment was designed for within-subject
manipulation. Each trial of the primary task con-
sisted of two displays. The first was a memory
display during which participants were required to
memorise the orientation of a set of eight rec-
tangles. There was a 50% chance that one of the rec-
tangles would change orientation between the
memory and the test display. The rectangle that
could change orientation was cued during the inter-
val between the two displays (FM condition) or after
the test display presentation (WM condition). During
the test display, participants were required to
answer whether there was a change in the cued rec-
tangle’s orientation by pressing one of the arrow
keys on the keyboard: the right arrow was pressed
for “change” and the left arrow for “no change”.
The memory display began with a 1000 ms fix-
ation point. Memory stimuli subsequently appeared
for 250 ms. After the offset of the memory stimuli,
only the fixation point remained on the screen.
The flow of events during each trial is presented in
Figure 1.
The time duration between memory display and
testing display in each trial was manipulated
between groups. In the FM condition (Vanden-
broucke et al., 2014), the inter-stimulus-interval (ISI)
lasted for 2000 ms. and the length of the ISI in the
WM condition was 900 ms. The key difference
between the conditions was the cue presentation,
which could be either before the test display, or a
moment after. During the FM condition, the cue
appeared 900 ms after the offset of the memory
display. In the WM condition, the cue was provided
1000 ms after the offset of the memory display and,
more importantly, it appeared 100 ms after the test
display onset. In both conditions, the duration of the
cue was 100 ms. The test display remained present
until the response. The experimental conditions,
that is, timing and stimuli, were mostly based on
Vandenbroucke et al. (2014), with the exception of
the number of rectangles presented in each trial
(which we kept constant) and the scale (see Figure 1
for the overview of the procedure).
At the end of each trial, after the change detec-
tion response, participants were required to
provide a subjective assessment of target visibility.
The PAS was provided with a short description of
each point: 1 – no experience; 2 – weak experience;
3 – almost clear experience; and 4 – absolutely clear
experience (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). Participants
completed 15 practice trials at the beginning of the
experiment that were excluded from further analy-
sis. The experiment consisted of 500 randomly inter-
mixed trials (250 trials per each condition).
Data analysis
The analysis was performed using Matlab r2015a
Software, MathWorks® (Massachusetts, USA) utilising
the functions to calculate change detection sensi-
tivity (d’) and metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’)
provided by Maniscalco (2014) and Maniscalco and
Lau (2012). We chose the function that uses
maximum likelihood estimation ( fit_meta_d_MLE).
We also calculated the deviation from the diagonal,
called Area Under the Curve (AUC), which provides a
bias-free measure of metacognitive sensitivity. To
calculate AUC we used the function provided by
Figure 1. Flow of events during the FM (top) and the WM (bottom) conditions.
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Lau (2014). The data for the analysis included the
correct and incorrect responses along with the sub-
jective visibility assessment in a trial-by-trial format.
The analysis presented below, comparing the
measures mentioned above in a between-subject
design, was run as a Bayesian paired samples t-
test. The Cauchy prior width was fixed at a default
level of 0.707, as suggested in JASP®, the free
open-source statistics package (Love et al., 2015) in
which the analysis was run.
Results and discussion
To objectively evaluate performance, the d’ sensi-
tivity was calculated for each participant. The
hypotheses tested was that the d’ for FM would be
higher than for the WM condition. The average d’
for the FM condition was M = 1.86 (SD = .70) and
for the WM condition was M = 1.01 (SD = .46). This
data were more likely to be found under the alterna-
tive hypothesis, as BF10 > 1000.
We calculated the mean PAS values for each par-
ticipant to check whether they differed between
conditions. For the FM condition,M = 3.09 (SD = .38),
and for the WM condition, M = 2.67 (SD = .42). The
Bayes Factor for the alternative hypothesis reached
the level of BF10 > 1000, indicating that the data
were more likely to occur under the alternative
hypothesis.
To assess the level of metacognitive sensitivity,
we analysed the type II Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) curve. The mean AUC for FM reached
M = .77 (SD = .08) and for WM, M = .67 (SD = .07).
The data were more probable under the alternative
hypothesis, as BF10> 1000 (see Figure 4. for the
Receiver Operating Curves for Experiments 1 and 2).
We also calculated a measure of metacognitive
sensitivity, called the meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau,
2012). The meta-d’ in the FM condition reached
M = 1.81 (SD = .59) and in the WM condition, M
= .98 (SD = .49). The data were more probable
under the alternative hypothesis, as BF10 > 1000.
To take into account the variability of d’ across
the conditions when assessing metacognitive accu-
racy, we calculated the meta-d’/d’ value (called the
metacognitive efficiency – Fleming & Lau, 2014) for
each condition for every subject. For the FM con-
dition, M = 1.03 (SD = .30) and for the WM con-
dition, M = 1.00 (SD = .33). The data were more
probable under the null hypothesis, as BF01 = 3.84.
The ratio of around 1 shows that all information
available for the discrimination task was also avail-
able for the visibility judgment (see Figure 2 for a
bar chart depicting the values of d’, meta-d’, and
meta-d’/d’).
We observed differences in the objective accu-
racy between FM and WM that were followed by
differences in metacognitive sensitivity. In both
cases, FM seemed superior to WM. These results
suggest that WM and FM represent different
levels of metacognitive sensitivity. After correcting
for the differences in accuracy, it appeared that
both types of memory have an equal level of meta-
cognitive efficiency (i.e. the meta-d’/d’). The utility
of this measure will be discussed later in the text.
To investigate whether there are any differences
between FM and the IM, we conducted a second
experiment.
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. The separate bars represent the mean sensitivity (d’), the metacognitive sensitivity
(meta-d’), and the metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) as a function of condition.
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Experiment 2
The second experiment’s aim was to investigate the
accessibility of information under the FM and IM
conditions. Again, we used the partial-report
change detection paradigm, for which we employed
two conditions. The conditions differed in cue pres-
entation timing. As previously, we applied the PAS to
evaluate conscious access to the content of memory.
Method
Participants
Nineteen students from Jagiellonian University (4
males and 15 females with the mean age of 21.7,
SD = 2.63) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision took part in the second experiment. Two par-
ticipants were excluded from further analysis due to
their random performance in the FM condition
(accuracy around 50%). Participants read and
signed an informed consent form prior to the
study and were debriefed regarding the purpose
of the experiment at the end. There was no financial
compensation.
Equipment and stimuli
The equipment and the stimuli were the same as in
the first experiment.
Trial design
The procedure was analogical to the one from the
first experiment except that the WM condition was
replaced with the IM condition and compared with
the FM condition (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). The
ISI duration in the IM condition was 1050 ms and
the cue appeared 50 ms after the offset of the
memory display (see Figure 1). Participants were
also required to provide an answer regarding the
visibility of the stimulus after deciding whether a
change had occurred (see Figure 3. for the overview
of the procedure).
Participants completed 15 practice trials at the
beginning of the experiment that were excluded
from further analysis. The experiment consisted of
500 randomly intermixed trials (250 trials per each
condition).
Data analysis
The data were analysed in the same manner as in
the first experiment.
Results and discussion
In order to evaluate performance objectively, we cal-
culated d’ sensitivity for each participant. The
hypotheses tested was that d’ for FM would be
lower than for the IM condition. The mean d’ for
the FM condition was M = 1.67 (SD = .69) and for
the IM condition, M = 2.23 (SD = .82). The data
were more probable under the alternative hypoth-
esis, as BF10 > 1000.
The mean PAS values calculated for each partici-
pant were M = 2.97 (SD = .45) for the FM condition
and M = 3.29 (SD = .45) for the IM condition. The
data were more probable under the alternative
hypothesis, as BF10 > 1000.
The mean AUC for FM reached M = .75 (SD = .08)
and for IM, M = .81 (SD = .08). The data were more
probable under the alternative hypothesis, as BF10
> 100 (see Figure 4 for the Receiver Operating
Curves for Experiment 1 and 2).
The meta-d’ in the FM condition reachedM = 1.61
(SD = .60) and in the IM condition, M = 2.10 (SD =
1.02). The data were more probable under the
alternative hypothesis, as BF10 = 6.14.
Figure 3. Flow of events during the FM (top) and the IM (bottom) conditions.
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The meta-d’/d’ value for the FM condition was
M = 1.02 (SD = .29) and for the IM condition was
M = .96 (SD = .31). The data were more probable
under the null hypothesis, as BF01 = 3.29 (see
Figure 5 for a bar chart depicting the values of d’,
meta-d’, and meta-d’/d’).
In the second experiment, we observed differ-
ences in the objective accuracy between IM and
FM that were followed by differences in metacogni-
tive sensitivity. In both cases, IM seemed superior to
FM. These results would suggest that IM and FM rep-
resent different levels of metacognitive sensitivity.
After correcting for the differences in task accuracy,
it again appeared that both types of memory have
an equal level of metacognitive efficiency. Correct-
ing the metacognitive sensitivity measure for the
differences in the objective performance may yield
different results than keeping the objective accuracy
at a similar level in all conditions, especially when we
probe participants’ subjective visibility on a trial-by-
trial basis. Assuming the differences in objective
accuracy influence metacognitive sensitivity, these
two approaches may lead to different results. There-
fore, we conducted another experiment, in which
Figure 4. Type II receiver operating curves for Experiment 1 and 2.
Figure 5. Results from Experiment 2. The separate bars represent the mean sensitivity (d’), the metacognitive sensitivity
(meta-d’), and the metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) as a function of condition.
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we introduced a staircase method to keep the per-
formance at a similar level throughout the exper-
iment. Additionally, we performed the experiment
in a within-subject design.
Experiment 3
The third experiment’s aim was to investigate the
accessibility of information under FM, IM, and WM
conditions in a within-subject design. We used a
staircase procedure to keep the level of task accu-
racy similar between the conditions. Again, we
used the partial-report change detection paradigm,
for which we employed the three conditions. As pre-
viously, we applied the PAS to evaluate conscious
access to the content of memory
Method
Participants
Nineteen students from Jagiellonian University (6
males and 13 females with mean age, M = 20.11,
SD = 1.33) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision took part in the third experiment. One of
the participants was excluded from further analysis
due to inappropriate use of the response keys. Par-
ticipants read and signed an informed consent
form prior to the study and were debriefed regard-
ing the purpose of the experiment at the end. As
compensation, participants received course credits.
Equipment and stimuli
The experiment was programmed in Matlab r2015a
Software, MathWorks® (Massachusetts, USA) using
the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007). Par-
ticipants were tested in groups and each participant
was seated in an individual semi-booth, approxi-
mately 60 cm from the screen (the viewing distance
was unconstrained). The stimuli were the same as in
the two previous experiments. The only change con-
cerned the number of white bars, which varied
because of the staircase procedure.
Trial design
The procedure was analogical to the one from the
first experiment except that all the conditions (IM,
FM, and WM) were tested within-subject in separate
blocks. We used the two-up one-down staircase pro-
cedure (García-Pérez, 1998). One bar was added to
the memory display after two consecutive correct
responses, and one bar was removed after one
incorrect response. This type of staircase usually
results in around 70% discriminative accuracy.
Participants completed 15 practice trials at the
beginning of each block that were excluded from
further analysis. The experiment consisted of 360
trials (120 trials per condition).
Data analysis
The data were analysed in the same manner as in
the first experiment, except that a Bayesian
Repeated Measures ANOVA was added to compare
the three within-subject conditions.
Results and discussion
In order to evaluate performance objectively, we cal-
culated the d’ sensitivity for each participant. The
mean d’ for the FM condition was M = 1.41
(SD = .41); for the IM condition, M = 2.20 (SD = .63);
and for the WM condition, M = 1.07 (SD = .29). The
data were more probable under the alternative
hypothesis, as BF10 > 1000. The post hoc analysis
revealed that when comparing the FM and IM con-
ditions, the alternative hypothesis was more likely,
BF10 > 100; similarly when comparing the WM and IM
conditions, BF10 > 1000; and FMwithWM, BF10 = 16.26.
The mean PAS values calculated for each partici-
pant were as follows: for the FM condition, M = 2.75
(SD = .43); for the IM condition, M = 3.15 (SD = .56);
and for the WM condition, M = 2.80 (SD = .55). The
alternative hypothesis was more likely to be true,
as BF10 = 41.33. The post hoc analysis, using a
paired samples t-test, revealed that there was a
difference between the FM and IM conditions, as
BF10 = 39.48, and between the WM and IM con-
ditions, as BF10 = 7.28. The FM and WM conditions
did not differ, as BF01 = 3.60.
The mean AUC for FM reached the level ofM = .72
(SD = .05); for IM, M = .81 (SD = .07); and for the WM,
M = .67 (SD = .04). The observed data were more
probable under the alternative hypothesis, as BF10
> 1000. Post hoc tests showed that the alternative
hypothesis was more likely when comparing the
FM and IM conditions, as BF10 > 100; the WM and
IM, BF10 > 1000; and the FM with WM, BF10 = 65.51
(see Figure 6 for the receiver operating curves for
Experiment 3).
The meta-d’ in the FM condition reached the level
of M = 1.54 (SD = .72); in the IM condition, M = 2.23
(SD = 1.23); and in the WM condition, M = 0.78
(SD = .49). The alternative hypothesis was more
likely to be true, as BF10 > 1000. The post hoc test
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for the difference between FM and IM revealed only
an anecdotal level of evidence in favour of the
alternative hypothesis, BF10 = 1.65. The difference
between WM and IM was highly probable, as BF10
> 100, as was the difference between the FM and
WM conditions, as BF10 = 48.78.
The meta-d’/d’ value for the FM condition, M =
1.08 (SD = .39); for the IM condition, M = 1.03
(SD = .43); and for the WM condition, M = 0.74
(SD = .49). There was only anecdotal evidence sup-
porting the alternative hypothesis, as BF10 = 2.31.
When the meta-d’/d’ was compared between the
FM and IM conditions, the strength of evidence for
the null hypothesis was moderate, as BF01 = 3.85.
The strength of evidence for the difference
between the WM and IM conditions was only anec-
dotal, BF10 = 1.68, as well as for the difference
between the FM and WM, as BF10 = 1.86 (see
Figure 7 for a bar chart depicting the values of d’,
meta-d’, and meta-d’/d’).
In the third experiment, we observed differences
in objective accuracy between all the conditions that
were followed by differences in metacognitive sensi-
tivity. As in the two previous experiments, in both
cases IM seemed superior to FM and WM, and FM
also seemed superior to WM. These results suggest
that the three stages of memory do indeed rep-
resent different levels of metacognitive sensitivity.
The safest conclusion we can draw from the analysis
regarding the meta-d’/d’ index is that there is prob-
ably no difference in metacognitive efficiency
between the FM and IM conditions. In addition, we
observed that WM might be associated with lower
metacognitive efficiency than both FM and IM,
although the evidence is only anecdotal.
General discussion
The three memory stages investigated in our studies
(i.e. IM, FM, and WM) seem to differ in the level of
objective discrimination accuracy (i.e. capacity).
The highest accuracy (d’) was associated with IM,
then FM, and the lowest, with WM. We also observed
differences in metacognitive sensitivity (AUC and
meta-d’) that mirrored the differences in task
Figure 6. Type II receiver operating curves for Experiment 3.
Figure 7. Results from Experiment 3. The separate bars represent the mean sensitivity (d’), the metacognitive sensitivity
(meta-d’), and the metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) as a function of condition.
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accuracy. After correcting for the differences in the
task performance (meta-d’/d’), the conditions seem
to represent the same level of metacognitive
efficiency.
As we would expect, the observed task accuracy
results are based on classical research focused on
the capacity of WM and IM (Sperling, 1960) and
those investigating FM, the additional stage in
memory processing (Sligte et al., 2008; Vanden-
broucke, Sligte, Barrett, et al., 2014; Vandenbroucke,
Sligte, & Lamme, 2011). As predicted by the classical
models, the capacity of IM seems to be much larger
than the capacity of WM, with FM in the middle. The
FM results are systematically different, which con-
firms the existence of the separate type of
memory system proposed by Vandenbroucke et al.
(2011). However, the results supporting the exist-
ence of FM could be alternatively interpreted as
the retro-cue effect (e.g. Makovski et al., 2008). The
retro-cue effect denotes the accuracy improvement
after introducing a cue during the interval to inform
participants which item is going to be tested
(Makovski et al., 2008; Souza et al., 2014). It thus
seems that one should analyse the differences in
the accessibility of memory content to justify
further the qualitative distinction between the afore-
mentioned memory subsystems.
A similar pattern of results was found when sub-
jective accessibility is taken into account (measured
with the AUC, which, opposite to the meta-d’
measure does not have the ideal observer assump-
tion – Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). We found that IM
was associated with the highest level of subjective
accessibility, WM with the lowest, and FM again
somewhere in the middle. These results do not go
hand in hand with the data obtained by Vanden-
broucke et al. (2014), in which FM represented the
highest level of metacognitive sensitivity, and IM
and WM were slightly worse. This is important, as
Vandenbroucke and colleagues interpret this effect
as evidence for equal accessibility of items pro-
cessed by IM and WM, which is not confirmed by
our data. Importantly, our data are also not consist-
ent with the classical models of WM, suggesting that
WM accessibility should be better than both FM and
IM (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Baddeley, 2012).
One of the explanations regarding the differences
between our study and the study by Vandenbroucke
et al. (2014) is associated with the scale utilised to
measure the subjective visibility of the stimulus.
Instead of using the same CR scale that taps into
judgment knowledge as Vandenbroucke et al.
(2014), we decided to administer the PAS as it is
claimed to be more suitable for perceptual tasks
and may capture visibility more directly (Overgaard
& Sandberg, 2012). This would explain why we
obtained different results than Vandenbroucke and
colleagues, but not why WM content was found to
be least accessible (which is contrary to the assump-
tions of most of the aforementioned WM models).
The other possible explanation relates to the very
assumption of different memory subsystems being
engaged in the task conditions. Note that in all of
the conditions, we only asked about the subjective
accessibility of the currently cued stimulus. Thus,
even in the IM condition, we did not test the acces-
sibility of pure IM, but rather the accessibility of the
element processed in IM for which the processing
was further amplified by cuing attention to that
element (e.g. Thibault, van den Berg, Cavanagh, &
Sergent, 2016). This seems to be supported by the
meta-d’/d’ index analysis, according to whose
results metacognitive efficiency is equal for the
three aforementioned stages of memory. Although
it would seem that this supports claims put
forward by Vandenbroucke et al. (2014), we argue
that it does not. Assuming the interpretation men-
tioned above, using the partial-report change detec-
tion procedure in the current form can only inform
us about the accessibility of the cued item, which
may differ from the accessibility of the other items.
This interpretation reflects the classical way of
studying conscious accessibility, in which conscious-
ness was strongly linked to attention. One example
is Baars’ Global Workspace theory (see e.g. Baars &
Franklin, 2003), which assumes that consciousness
is associated with global distribution of information
in the brain and that all the components of WM that
become activated are conscious (e.g. rehearsal or
visuospatial operations). The close link between con-
sciousness and attention is postulated by some of
the most prominent models of awareness
(Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent,
2006). However, many other scientists disagree
(Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, & Usher, 2014;
Lamme, 2006) and provide evidence in favour of
the disunity of these two phenomena or draw atten-
tion to the conscious processes outside of the focus
of attention. Solving this problem could help answer
the question whether the content of WM must
necessarily be conscious and what the relation is
between WM and attention. It will also help to deter-
mine to what extent IM, FM, and WM are consciously
accessible. For now, there is a discrepancy between
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the classical theories of memory and new empirical
evidence (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Baars & Franklin,
2003; Soto et al., 2011; Vandenbroucke et al., 2014).
While being reviewed in the context of studies
investigating differences between WM, IM and
FM, the data we acquired seem puzzling, though
when seen in the light of current studies engaged
in exploring the function of WM, the interpretation
begins to be quite straightforward. A model intro-
duced by Nelson Cowan and further developed
by Klaus Oberauer (Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 2009)
describes memory as a functionally specialised
(but structurally unified) system, with attention at
the base of the functional distinction. This model
accounts for the possibility of WM operating on
unconscious information. Cowan unified LTM with
WM, assuming WM to be an activated part of
LTM. WM, according to this model, can be decom-
posed into the region of direct access and the focus
of attention. These two stages of WM differ in
capacity, with only one element being held in the
focus of attention, though the attention could fluc-
tuate between four elements. The model also
assumes that only the element in the focus of
attention is processed consciously (Oberauer,
2009). This again seems to be consistent with the
proposed interpretation of our results; namely,
that the cue induces attentional amplification but
not differences in conscious access between IM,
FM, and WM. For this purpose, one should
instead test the accessibility of the information
that did not reach the focus of attention due to
the cue presentation.
To sum up, the extraordinary results acquired by
Vandenbroucke et al. (2014) suggested that the IM
and FM might be associated with conscious proces-
sing. This postulation was based on the observation
of the similar accessibility of the content in WM and
IM (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). Our results did not
support this interpretation as we observed a differ-
ence in WM and IM capacity and accessibility
(however, see the results of meta-d’/d’ index). A
question remains whether the partial-report
change detection paradigm in its current form
enables items outside of the focus of attention to
be studied in order to tap into the IM or FM proces-
sing. The next logical step would be to investigate
the subjective visibility outside of the focus of atten-
tion (see Bronfman et al., 2014). It also seems impor-
tant to choose an appropriate method for assessing
the subjective accessibility of the memory content
that is based purely on the experience of stimulus
and is not associated with any judgment regarding
the efficiency of cognitive processes.
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